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Speech by Joschka Fischer at Humboldt University, Berlin, at the Council Meeting of the European Green Party, 16.3.2007

A very good evening to you. I would like to begin with a comment which is directed at the media rather than the audience: no, this is not a return to German domestic politics, nor is it a return to Green politics – so there's no need to write or speculate about that.

Rather, it is our longstanding friendship – it was Dani in his impressive way who persuaded me to be here – and also the passion for the theme which drives us all, and this passion is also something which we share, namely the future of Europe. What I would like to do here is to contribute something to the analysis of Europe's situation from an outsider's view and perhaps also to help open up fresh perspectives for the future.

And a second very brief comment to my party: this is not about me making a party political statement or intervening in the Greens' affairs. It is simply how I see things. The party may take a different view on one point or another; it may even have a fundamentally different standpoint, but that is not something that should really concern us this evening.

What does concern us is the important topic of Europe – indeed, I believe it is the key topic for the future. Fifty years of the Treaty of Rome: these documents were signed on 25 March 1957, in a chamber, incidentally, where a larger-than-life black marble pope holds his hand out in blessing. What was Europe like in those days? Let's look back before we look forward. At that time, Europe was in the grip of the Cold War. The Wall had not yet been built and yet there were crises in Berlin, and a year earlier, barely a year earlier, half a year earlier, in November 1956, the uprising in Hungary, brutally crushed by the Red Army. It was a time when for my generation at least – I was nine years old – the fear of war was still palpable. By that, I mean that the physical fear that a war could happen was still a tangible reality, and the ruins of the Second World War which children of my generation still played in showed us only too clearly what war was all about. This Europe was a Western Europe. East Berlin, East Germany, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain were excluded from it.

This Europe was founded on a security policy decision whose significance must never be underestimated, namely the decision by the United States of America, unlike the situation after the First World War – the debate began in the US Congress just a few months after the end of the Second World War – not to withdraw from Europe, and not to abandon Europe, Western Europe, to its fate, and it then escalated during the first major Berlin crisis with the Berlin blockade. In other words, not to abandon West Berlin but to keep it alive with the airlift.

This decision is so important because without it, the second decision – with its consequences which we are discussing today – would probably never have been adopted. This second decision was the recognition by Schuman and Monnet – French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and his state secretary Jean Monnet – that the old European system of states had led to two world wars and, in these two world wars, had finally destroyed itself.

In 1945 Europe was divided between the Soviet Union and the USA, the two major victorious powers, and the idea was that this Europe needed a future which could no longer be based on the balance of power, which could no longer be based primarily on the power rivalry between powerful states. Instead, the idea was to bring the strategic interests together, and that meant no longer fighting out these conflicting interests on the battlefields but negotiating them on the basis of law and democracy and implementing the outcomes in joint institutions, and it meant pooling some of the state sovereignty over these interests. It began with coal and steel, and then there would be something for us Greens – long before the founding of our party – for the third point was to be joint control over nuclear issues, we must not forget that, and what then emerged was the notion of an economic community and the Treaty of Rome.

And this idea created an entirely new reality. Anyone who wants to understand Europe must understand that a new system of states thus emerged in Western Europe – a system of states which relies on integration, something which has never previously existed in this form since the creation of the new, the modern states. It means that sovereign states pool their interests, their key interests, despite all their differences, despite all the unsettled accounts of which there were, and are, more than enough during our shared history.

The idea was that there should never again be a war. And if we look at the European Union from that perspective today, if we look back, it is a uniquely successful model in history. Immanuel Kant, the great philosopher from

Königsberg, wrote an essay entitled *Project for a Perpetual Peace*. And I don't know if anyone has noticed the irony, for there was a little picture in the original showing a Dutch tavern of the same name, and there was a coffin depicted in it. You see, in German, we also talk about 'perpetual peace' – we say 'may you rest in perpetual peace', but we do so when someone is carried to their grave.

And this linkage of perpetual peace, this ambiguity, naturally has very particular significance for Europe. Today, we can say that for Europe as a whole, this perpetual peace – well, in this veil of tears, it is unwise for anyone to claim that it is secure once and for all, but everything suggests that there is no longer any prospect of war on our continent. If – if – this European integration continues in future.

I believe this is the most important thing to understand. And our generation in particular, the younger generation – we experienced it in the Balkans in 1991, how these entire shadows of the past suddenly became reality again, how the issue of border changes was resolved by military force, the denial of the law, ethnic cleansing, how all this suddenly resurfaced on our continent as Yugoslavia broke apart. And although the actors at the time may only have realised this to a limited extent, it is clear with hindsight that it was also a challenge for the new Europe, the Europe of integration, and we must learn from this that our continent cannot be based on two principles – a Europe of integration, on the one hand, and a 'Europe in between' on the other. I say 'between' because it would then lie between Russia and the Europe of Brussels, thus creating a Europe 'in between' based on the outdated principles of state sovereignty, the balance of power and nationalist ideologies. That would be extremely dangerous.

No, my friends, this new Europe has genuinely created an enduring peace on our continent. It has also made democracy and the rule of law the only political and constitutional form, with very few exceptions. The question of social justice is more advanced in Europe than almost anywhere else, despite all the differences that exist between the national traditions, and also economic competitiveness which this social justice deserves. And I believe that the Greens in Europe, the Greens in Germany, the environmental movement can be proud of what has been achieved so far in terms of Europe's ecological transformation compared with other parts of the world or other countries.

But that is the retrospective view. If we look forward, a very different picture emerges. Since the 'no' votes in France and the Netherlands, the EU has faced the deepest crisis in its history. Enlargement – this magnificent achievement – has massively exacerbated this crisis and has certainly not made solving it any easier. The EU finds itself in deep institutional crisis; its needs, its objective needs are based on its own interests in acting and its capacity to act, but these are visibly diverging. Globalisation presents it with completely new challenges: the shaping of globalisation, but also the fact of it per se. After all, the secret of the Cold War was that it was not just a threat; it also – although nobody talked about it – offered a certain protection.

The Greens, the ecologists, in particular are all too familiar with the 20:80 rule, the old formula of the Club of Rome. It says that 20 per cent of the people control the world's assets but create 80 per cent of the problems, while 80 per cent of the people are excluded and create just 20 per cent of the environmental problems. But I ask you this, my friends: does this equation still hold good today? If we talk about globalisation, we must understand that from the viewpoint of a man or woman living in Shanghai or in Bangalore, or even in Dhaka, in Bangladesh, globalisation looks very different to the way it looks from the European or American perspective.

The Cold War therefore also afforded protection because at that time, the so-called world market consisted of 800 million to one billion people, the Club of Rome's famous 20%, and this did not even include all those who lived in the West. But since the fall of the Wall – and I would almost use the term political 'Big Bang' in this connection, because it went far beyond the usual outcomes of a major revolution – since then, what we term the world market has expanded to two and a half to three billion people. And everyone will try to move in this direction.

Today, we have a world, a global communications reality, in which the same dreams, the same wishes are shown everywhere. And I cannot think of a single reason why we could have any right to say that the threshold countries, with their large populations, should not move in the same direction. The desire for social security, for education and training for one's children, the desire to be able to fulfil one's dreams, for mobility, for a car of one's own, for a television, a fridge, for rights, the desire no longer to be dependent on arbitrary government, political authoritarianism or employers – nearly seven billion people now dream this dream of progress, and they are right.

And at the same time, we know that the unintended environmental consequences are likely to confront us with one of the most radical challenges in the history of the Western industrial society – and that will of course have massive economic impacts too. The Greens see themselves as a modern party of the Left, and the Left knows

very well that distribution issues invariably arise here too – and of course it is very easy to talk about distribution issues in the lecture hall – but if the distribution issue appears to be imposing a burden on us, at least 'us' in the sense of the nation or Europe, things suddenly look very different.

What's more, the security situation of the Cold War – as dangerous as it was – has now been replaced by a security situation which is much less clear-cut. The self-weakening of the United States through its policy of unilateralism which led it into Iraq will confront Europe with very, very serious problems. We are the geopolitical neighbours [of the Middle East], let's not forget that. Theoretically, the United States could withdraw; it does not intend to do so at present, but it will pursue a different form of commitment in future. What then? The crisis in the Middle East will still exist and will have to be solved. So we face major changes, and the question which then arises, to my mind, is this: are we Europeans prepared for this? Or to put it more provocatively, if the Europeans are not prepared, must we then revert to the old nation-state?

This is not just a theoretical question: to anyone following the European and indeed the German debate from a distance, it is clear that the debate is still being conducted primarily from the national perspective. And even in a large country like Germany, there is no proper debate, and the same applies to France and Great Britain, especially on the key security issues, such as 'what must we do to assert European interests?' This has nothing to do with party politics; this is the European reality. I think that the Constitution, had it been accepted, would have created a different framework here, but I'll come back to that.

So we face a situation – and, my friends, the last few months have been very instructive in this respect – in which the others will not wait. My former Indian counterpart, the former Indian Foreign Minister, was recently in Princeton where he gave a lecture and he spoke with such assurance that I wished people really could have listened to the message in Europe as well. He said, 'There will be three superpowers in the 21st century: India, China and the USA'. He did not say a word about Europe. To those people who might say, 'OK, why should anyone be talking about us anyway?' I can only say this: because such a lot depends on it. Whether we Europeans maintain our decision-making powers in future will depend on it, and whether we maintain our concept of what kind of society we want will depend on it – a society in which there is antagonism between Left and Right, but in essence – if we look back – along a line of consensus which involves negotiation on the fine detail in daily politics, but which, overall, the Europeans share and which characterises them, with very few exceptions. And another element is competitiveness via a certain redistributive effect and social justice as an essential, a key part of the European model. These are the issues which will depend on it. And we must be very vigilant and ensure that we are not too slow, for things are changing very rapidly.

Here in Humboldt University – as Dani has already mentioned – I once gave a speech, and this speech was dominated by the federalist dreams of Europe, and I freely admit that if I had to choose between being a federalist or being an intergovernmentalist, I would always opt for federalism. However, we must also recognise that although the federalist dreams are the visions that have driven this European project, this Europe can no longer be shaped by these federalist dreams unless the awareness of Europe's interests forms the basis for the implementation of this vision: the Europe of interests. From my perspective, that is the crucial point. Let's look back again to 1989 so that I can elaborate on the importance of this Europe of interests. Let's cast a glance back at all the debates which followed this historic watershed in world politics. The federalist dream was always the dream of a United States of Europe, that was the point of it, but this dream was not dreamed by the majority of Europeans. The Scandinavian tradition, the British tradition is different, and I understand that. From a Swedish perspective, what added value does the European Union have to offer? The original Europeans were driven by a desire to ensure that there could never be another war. But Sweden already had an old established democracy; it did not need Brussels for that. It had a flourishing economy, a strong market economy, and a strong welfare state. Sweden is a leader with or without the European Union. So why is there any need for a transfer of sovereignty? That is the question that Europeans who have a more fortunate history are asking. In the Mediterranean region, on the other hand, it is quite clear: democracy, social progress, economic prosperity and the rule of law are all associated with Europe; in other words, there, Europe is a success story. We Europeans have different starting points and different traditions, but I believe that it is European interests which constitute the vital shared new element today. And monetary union has established a new quality: for the first time, a core element of sovereignty – and I would define sovereignty as comprising three elements, namely control over external security, internal security, and monetary sovereignty – in monetary union, a new step was taken in the integration process, not by everyone but by the majority of EU Member States and this monetary union will have long-term consequences. But the same has happened – and is happening – on the issue of security as well. I have mentioned Kosovo, I have mentioned the Balkans, and let me remind you, my friends, how Europe was caught up in its own history in 1991, with Berlin and Vienna coming down on Croatia's side and Paris and London on Serbia's. The consequences were dreadful. But it is not just Europe; it is also the Middle East, it is our neighbourhood, and it is

Russia. And our neighbourhood also includes the great continent of Africa to the south. Does anyone seriously believe, firstly, that we can always rely on the USA, and that it will always be there? A lot of people complain about the USA, but when the going gets tough, as it did in the Balkans, nothing can be done without it. What can be done about Darfur without the USA, even if the European Union could agree? And secondly, will we Europeans be able to safeguard our own security and develop a common foreign policy? We now have common interests, European interests. Let me ask you this: in our foreign relations, external economic relations, external energy relations, in any area, but also in security and foreign policy, is there one truly vital interest on which even the most powerful nation-states in the European Union, namely Great Britain and France – nuclear powers and permanent members of the Security Council – or the largest and most economically powerful country, namely Germany, could successfully assert their interests on their own? I cannot think of any. To make it even clearer, take a look at the Security Council. There are two European powers on the Security Council, old European powers, former great powers – indeed, Great Britain was the world power for more than two centuries. They both have the right of veto, but it is quite obvious that although this right exists, it is very rarely to be used. Why? It is quite simple: because the political weight is waning. Aside from decisions which affect the very core of the French or British national interest, I do not see any way in which France or the UK could still make use of the veto. But it would be completely different if they had the entire European Union backing them. In other words, once a consensus is formed, once France and Great Britain could say: 'We are speaking for Europe', the situation looks totally different. I am just using this as an example to show how things change and how, in reality, the weights have shifted. And let me say again: we must understand that a common European foreign and security policy is at the very forefront of our shared interests.

What about Russia? This is the question which underlies the issue that currently threatens to divide Europe again, namely missile defence. It underlies the hotly debated issue, or the controversy, over energy supply. How should Europe shape its relationship with Russia? On the one hand, of course, it is quite clear: this is our immediate neighbourhood and over recent centuries, Russia, as a European power, has played a key role in stability and security on our continent and that will continue. The question is simply: under which conditions? And this question arose with full force for the first time in Ukraine in the crisis that was triggered by the fraudulent elections. And it was Europe which, soon after enlargement, a few months afterwards – Europe, not the USA – which took resolute action via the Polish President and the Lithuanian President, with the EU being represented by Javier Solana, with many others working intensively behind the scenes. For it was quite clear that if Europe accepted that Russia was not our strategic partner but was reverting to a politics based on spheres of influence, a politics of imperialism, the security situation for Europe would take a dramatic turn for the worse. That was quite apparent in the Orange Revolution. That does not mean that every step in Russia's direction is therefore legitimate; on the contrary, much of it is short-sighted, blind and not determined by long-term interests and understanding, but there is, there must be, a clear red line here: Europe – the Europe on which the EU is building European integration – is incompatible with a politics based on spheres of influence. Otherwise, if we accept it, Europe's development will be dramatic and retrograde, and in a moment, I will run through the consequences that accepting this position would have in other regions as well.

As to the question of security: well, from an outsider's perspective, of course it is quite spooky when one of the key issues – missile defence – is not being discussed in the European Union. With all due respect to the difficulties – and in my view, it would be no easy task, if I consider the French and British positions and various other things, I do not believe that a Green position would ultimately prevail, even if the Greens are back in power from 2009, which could be the case. But I ask you to consider this: we can forget all the pretty speeches about a common foreign and security policy if these key issues are not discussed within the European Union framework and if no common European position is established as far as possible. I understand the difficulties faced by the German Presidency, I don't want to unleash any domestic political controversy here, but let me say again: leaving this issue to NATO will throw back Europe's progress on one of the key issues for our future security. I do understand the German Presidency, as I said, because I know that there is a reluctance to address a topic when you think you cannot really achieve anything in the six months, and now there are only a few months remaining, but in my view, this is a vital issue. And the underlying point is this: we can – we must – see at present, and I make no exceptions for us, what games Putin is playing with energy dependency. Poland is blocking a consensus and Greece is now focusing solely on concluding bilateral contracts. That is what we are doing with Europe – and no one will take us seriously if we allow this to happen, for these are our common interests, my friends, these are European interests, of course. These are European interests, and yet we are seeing decisions on missile defence being taken on a bilateral basis, decisions on energy dependency being taken on a bilateral basis, and regardless of the outcomes – and realistically, let me say again, God knows I have enough experience here – the outcomes will not necessarily be Green positions. Overall, however, if there is a European consensus, this step must be taken via closer coordination, better agreements, towards a common policy one day. I think that is crucial, for energy is one of the core issues, also in power political terms.

Let's cast a glance further around our neighbourhood, and this is the debate, and it has to do with enlargement: where does the European Union begin, and where does it end? I think this is quite easy to answer. In the west – as long as the USA does not apply to join the EU – Europe will begin with the Azores; in the north, with the Polar Sea, and in the south, with the Mediterranean – but where in the east? The memorable formula coined by the former French President General de Gaulle was 'from the Atlantic to the Urals', but I don't think that's a good idea, for the Urals are not in the middle of Russia – well, yes, they are in the middle of Russia, but I am speaking metaphorically, not geographically. I don't think it is a good idea and I do not believe that it is viewed as a good idea in Russia either. And this great country Russia is a world of its own; there is no European dimension, so [we need] strategically positive relations – close relations, if all goes well, if modernisation, democratisation and the rule of law finally assert themselves in Russia, and there is absolutely no question that this must be the future and that this must be our goal. But on the other hand, it is also clear that Berlusconi-esque membership of the European Union for Russia will never be a reality. So where does Europe end? This is a very difficult question, and I believe that we should also draw a line under the 'core Europe' debate in this context. Let's consider what Europe can actually preserve. There was always a desire to distance oneself, and this was driven by fear: it began when some people did not want the Italians, with the lira, to join the euro, that was Schäuble at the time. But behind it was also a sense that after this historic event in world history in 1989, when Europe was back, quite suddenly – not just the whole of Germany but the whole of Europe – behind it was also something of a desire to distance oneself. It was never admitted, of course, but it was driven by fear of the enormity of the challenge, and everyone felt it, and I was no exception. We must be aware of this, and if we accept the hypothesis that our key interests are now European interests, then core Europe is an idea which never became reality and belongs to history. It is not a prospect for the future. That has nothing to do with ideological distancing or anything like that; it is just that it will not work. The negative impacts of core Europe will quite simply be exorbitant and would run counter to European, to common interests. There is no reason why there cannot be a Europe of different speeds in future; indeed, I believe that is a given, but not aimed at exclusion, but with the aim of acting as the locomotive that moves the train forward, moving it forward, generating speed and thus driving the European integration process, not exclusively but inclusively. If we look at things that way, my friends, if we can draw a line under core Europe, the border issue can then be resolved. If it is the case that our strategic neighbourhood is defined with Russia, then we must keep the door open for all those who want to join Europe. In Ukraine, that is certainly not an easy task – let there be no misunderstanding here – which is why I think it is very important not to make hasty promises. That is where Russia and Europe meet: Western Ukraine wants to move towards Europe, whereas the east and south of the country have strong ties to Russia. But it is important for Ukraine to have a perspective, and that is why we too have an interest in the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, and the same applies to Belarus. And if I may say so, I am pleased – governments occasionally change their positions – that even in the Union, there is now a growing realisation that a rather more liberal visa policy can have quite a subversive effect in Belarus, I say that in all seriousness, but I do not want to discuss that in more detail; instead, let me continue with my thought. But that also means – and look, think for a moment what would have happened if we had not had the major enlargement? What kind of games would now be played with Ukraine and Belarus and their gas and oil supplies? What games are being played with Moldova and what kind of invitation would that be? So if my hypothesis of a Europe of interests, of common interests, is correct, we will have to keep the door for these nations open because we cannot and should not allow ourselves a little 'Europe in between'. The difficulty in defining the borders would, I believe, probably even resonate and earn applause in the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, starting with the issue of Turkey. And that, my friends, is a topic which is causing me a great deal of serious concern, for I truly believe in the Europe of interests. And just like the situation in Berlin and along the intra-German border, and some veterans of the peace movement are still sitting here today, they know that Ground Zero was not in downtown Manhattan but for many years, even decades, it was in the Fulda Gap. That's an American strategic planning term; it's somewhere near Schlitz. Those of us who are from Hesse know that, but the rest of you haven't a clue where Schlitz is, of course you don't. The Fulda Gap was an area of lower-lying land which was an obvious route for a breakthrough by Soviet troops if a real military confrontation ever occurred. At that time, Europe was dependent on what happened in the central area of tension in Germany and Berlin. But I wonder: why is the issue [of Turkey] so difficult to grasp? I realise that there are cultural objections, there are historical experiences, I understand a lot of it, but there are two things which we cannot deny: firstly, promises have been made to Turkey since 1963 – for reasons that weigh even more heavily today. Why was Turkey admitted to the Council of Europe? Why was Turkey admitted to NATO? Because at the time, it secured NATO's southern flank against the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact; in other words, there was a strategic interest. Why did Walter Hallstein, in his remarkable speech in 1963 – in parallel, incidentally, to the Association Agreement with Greece, it was a parallel process – why did he promise that one day, Turkey would be a full member of the European Economic Community? He did so for strategic reasons, for the same reason why Turkey is a member of NATO and a member of the Council of Europe. So given that back then, the centre of confrontation, the centre of the threat, lay along the intra-German border and the rest was merely a sideshow, we must surely recognise that

the key threats to our security today will lie in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. I have said it before: there are no options open to us to change our geopolitical situation, and we also have a third factor – Muslim immigration. So if we Europeans fail to grasp that we have every interest in living in peace with our Muslim neighbours in our country but also with our regional neighbours, if we fail to grasp that, then we fail to grasp the scale of the challenges facing us. Europe has every interest in a modern Islam. Europe must have every interest in proof that Islam and modernism, Islam and women's rights, Islam and human rights, the rule of law, a modern society and a strong civil society go together. And since 9/11, at the latest, this challenge is clear and we Europeans especially have experienced where blockades to social modernisation lead, and if you look around our regional neighbourhood and the potential threats – whether they come from terrorism, old regional conflicts, not just the regional conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours, the Palestinians and the other Arab neighbours, there are many other conflicts as well: we are now seeing how the conflict between the Shi'ites and the Sunnis is being instrumentalised and that behind it a hegemonic conflict between Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, on the one hand, and Iran on the other is in the process of developing. Further to the north, we have the unresolved challenges in the Caucasus. The borders in this region are all outcomes of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War or later. At the same time, oil and gas are present on such a scale that the Persian Gulf could be described as the world economy's filling station, and if we take all of this together and then factor in the prospect of a nuclear arms race unleashed by Iran's nuclear programme and its consequences, we must understand the times we live in, and yet at this very moment, we start to deal one rebuff after another to our Turkish partner. I honestly don't understand what we are doing. It is in our fundamental interest not only that Turkey should and must remain a pillar and an anchor of security in future; Turkey is also the country which, notwithstanding all the criticism – and for me, criticism does not mean getting involved in basic criticism, it means strengthening the forces in the country and encouraging the people in the institutions to continue the course towards a European Turkey and criticism is all part of that, let me just make that clear as well. Let me tell you, I am very concerned, and it is not enough to say: *Pacta sunt servanda* [pacts must be respected] if we let the process derail through our *unkind manner*. We are harming ourselves and let there be no misunderstanding: at Green conferences you get an easy round of applause for it, but I tell you, this is a very, very difficult debate, it's an uphill struggle, but it's a debate which needs to be conducted and that is the key point from my perspective. There has never been a really important decision on which anyone could bank on a majority from the outset; that's why leadership is needed, genuine leadership, and it is not enough to say, oh well, 'pacta sunt servanda' and otherwise, we hope it will all come to nothing, for the consequences that we will have to bear, my friends, will be considerable. It's not about applause and it's not about being provocative, but I honestly believe that we need to be looking at Germany's role for once, not only in relation to Turkey but throughout the region. And I understand some of the decisions, I understand some of the discussions, but there are some decisions which I do not understand, because from my perspective it seems quite clear: if the hypothesis that I have just put forward explaining the importance of Turkey is correct, then the same must of course apply to Israel as well – applause here too – but then it also applies to Lebanon and it also applies to Afghanistan, let's be clear about that. And let me share a very uncomfortable truth, based on my experience out there among our Alliance partners. In Germany we still do not seem to realise what responsibility we bear. Not from a German perspective: purely from a German perspective, there is no reason why troops from the Federal Armed Forces should be stationed in the Hindu Kush. But from a European and transatlantic perspective, there are many good reasons, and that is something that we simply have to recognise. And I tell you – because six or seven Tornados have been deployed, and I understand the difficulties faced by an opposition party, but seven Tornados have been deployed – at last. At least that's something. The fact is that when the Canadians screamed for help because they had lost 60 men or more in the south in a matter of weeks, I tell you, it was not a wise decision by our Government and Parliament to ignore their cry. I say this quite frankly, for I can now allow myself the privilege of being completely frank: that will come back to haunt us. And I tell you this: the Europe of a common security and a common foreign policy will come to nothing in this way. It is not a formal EU matter, it's a NATO matter, but of course it has an impact, especially on the EU-NATO relationship, and I know how unpopular that is, but I'll say it again: it is necessary, right and important, and I understand my party's anguish and would not wish to interfere, but when it comes to my country's conduct, the decision to ignore the cry for help was something that deeply affected me, and I believe that we – and by 'we' I mean Germany – conducted ourselves in a way which was anything but right and future-oriented. And what about Lebanon? Why aren't the Italians and the French in Afghanistan being criticised in the way that we are? In Lebanon we are defending the coasts as a maritime power against the dreadful navy of Hezbollah and the Italians and French are pulling the chestnuts out of the fire there; it's not a formal European matter but it is a European responsibility and that, my friends, is very short-sighted in my view, for in a large and important country like Germany, everything will depend on how seriously we take the European message, whether we are genuinely prepared to work through all the consequences of responsibility, for otherwise, it will all come to nothing. And all I can say is that if I look at the actual dangers, and it's clear to everyone – everyone – that there are good reasons why we were against the war in Iraq, but we were also concerned that the USA would weaken itself as a result, and if the USA is weakened – and you might nurture anti-American illusions or express justified criticism, which is

often needed as well – but the question is this: who will fill the vacuum? It won't be peace-loving forces, you can bet on that.

And then we Europeans will suddenly face the question of whether we have the maturity to deal with the situation. So I don't want to give a speech here in which I say very nice things about Europe and its institutions and so on, although that is all very well and good and very important. But if we take it to its logical political conclusion, we are talking about a shared will, which means making good the institutional deficit of weak institutions and – although I am sorry to say this – it also means having the capabilities, both civilian and military, in Europe, so that we can actually stand up for a policy that we believe in, based on the rule of law, democracy, a commitment to equality for everyone, and based also on the recognition that we will not only achieve peace with words – although that too is something we have experienced. And the same applies to the southern continent, and I must just add that Afghanistan is hopelessly under-funded in the civilian sector, but it is also clear that in Pakistan, a strategic decision has been taken to prepare itself for the period after US dominance in the region. Wonderful Toyota pick-ups are not falling from the skies, and nor do they appear anywhere as a result of solidarity collections; the same applies to arms, and the same applies to command and control, the same applies to everything, the facts are on the table. We cannot ignore this, and the same applies on the great continent of Africa. The European Union is engaged, but are we really doing enough in Darfur? I am not talking about military intervention; there was a period of optimism which led to the peace agreements in Abuja, but now the situation is completely eroding. The situation is worsening, dramatically worsening, the air force is being deployed, and the killing, the rapes and the burning are continuing. I am not talking about military intervention here, although the question of the enforcement of a no-fly zone will arise. If Khartoum does not grasp that with this policy ... and while humanitarian issues are the first priority, the second priority is to look at the underlying conflict. And the underlying conflict is that there is no national consensus on the distribution of power and resources, the profits from oil and gas, and that is why there has been the uprising in the south, there is the uprising in Darfur, and there will be an uprising in the east of the country as well. And let me say this, there is an entirely pragmatic reason [for the EU to move forward on this issue], for if the peaceful options are not utilised, there is every sign that this large central country will start to disintegrate in the short or long term. And then we have a massive problem, which is why the European Union must move on this issue, and I wish the German Presidency would move forward here. Actually, I do not need to wish – Dani and I agree on this point – for the European Union has options and I believe it would also be good to do something here together on a transatlantic basis, for there is considerable willingness on the other side of the Atlantic. What we are now experiencing in relation to the sanctions against Iran is that targeted financial sanctions are very painful, especially for oil-exporting countries, [and] travel restrictions or travel bans, but the sanctions must be targeted at the financial flows, not supplies. In my view, Europe could do a lot here, and it would be even better if it could do so on the basis of a coordinated approach within the international community. And even China – which is the main investor in Sudan's oil and gas industry, followed by India – both will understand that in their own well-considered supply security interests, they must prevent this country from starting to disintegrate or even collapsing. The opportunity is there, and resolute action by Europe is a further key aspect. So I also believe that we should ... well, things will stumble along for a while, but America will soon go to the polls; there will be a new President and the impetus for transatlantic relations must also come from Europe. We cannot simply wait until the other side takes the initiative and things change. The Europeans also have a need for change: if we had a strong Europe today, the referendum would not have gone wrong and the debate about the return to multilateralism would be conducted very differently in the United States because it would have a strong partner to deal with. So Europe should not simply always repeat the transatlantic mantras; it must fill them with new content. There cannot be a transatlantic perspective without a strong Europe; that will not work. So I think that it is not just about missile defence – and by the way, I believe that missile defence is not worth a permanent split in Europe, and there will only be a European solution or there won't be one at all. I firmly believe that we must answer the underlying question – namely whether games can be played with us – and that will only be possible through a strong European security and foreign policy. As I said before, my friends, we need the shared political will, we need the capabilities, and we need the institutions. Europe is – quite rightly – proud of the fact that we recognised the environmental challenge before anyone else, you can all be proud of that. But I am always somewhat mistrustful, Jürgen, when I see the year 1990 on decisions: whether it's about reducing pollution or whatever, the political demise of the GDR and the investments in German unity form the basis for them. In the interests of honesty in the debate, I do not want to make any exceptions for us, but as I said before, in view of the challenges, it is not enough to look back. If we look forward, we see that the environmental challenges will increase dramatically, not because we Greens are prophets of doom; in fact, I am quite optimistic and confident about the successful growth being achieved in China, India, South-East Asia and in other parts of the world. But the flip side of this growth is already defined and can be set out in figures. The Earth's global ecosystem will not sustain this approach – i.e. we stay where we are and simply pile on more – in the long term. And that too has been recognised in almost every area. And if that's the case, my friends, then we will of course see that it is no longer only up to Germany, and that Europe is the key framework for action here. I am not yet joining the jubilant choir surrounding the European

decisions, because I ask myself, is this a new Maastricht, or is it a new Lisbon? I cannot shake off the suspicion that we are dealing with a new Lisbon: in other words, everyone is in favour because it is not about action. It reminds me a bit of the wonderful picture – the Commission, I mean – in which an old fisherman catches a giant swordfish; it's called *The Old Man and the Sea*, and he has to bring the fish back to port. The Commission's task now is to negotiate with the individual governments and then agree specific reduction targets and also negotiate the expansion of renewable energies at the same time. When the old man arrives back in port, all that is left of the fish is the skeleton, after the sharks and barracudas have had a go at it. Based on my own experience with Europe, I can imagine that not even the bones will be left if the Commission gets into this debate. It will depend on us. If we look at it that way, it's clear that we cannot sit back and relax, and that this will be the major challenge that requires really serious action at European level. For while the national level is important, serious action needs to be taken at European level and I believe that this is a major challenge, the second major challenge in peace and security, even before our adjustment to the new competition situation resulting from globalisation. It is the second major challenge, and I believe that the European Greens are extremely well-prepared for it. But I say again, it will extend deep into the heart of the industrial societies and I would caution against being pushed too much into the prohibition corner. Just so there's no misunderstanding: there will certainly be no shortage of regulations, the question is simply – and following the debate from outside, my impression is that those who for whatever reason feel the need to represent short-term interests will of course be delighted to be able to depict those who defend a sound environmental rationale as miserable killjoys who are obsessed with bans. So my advice is to look at California; they are managing very well. They have tough laws, they have tough regulations but they are certainly not remote from the world and they don't deny themselves fun or pleasure. From my perspective, these things can go together. And I do think that pressure now really needs to be brought to bear, and the major challenge will be to ensure that Green issues do not drift down the agenda. Incidentally, I would not be worried about the journalist's question whether, now that everyone is into 'eco', the Greens are superfluous. Actually, Jan, the question some years ago was: no one is interested in 'eco' any more, so aren't the Greens superfluous? We were never superfluous, and are certainly not superfluous now; don't even think about it. What I would think about is that Green parties but also environmental groups and initiatives generally represent a minority culture. Now, the issue has suddenly broken away from the minority and is growing towards the centre; it is dominating society and the economy. And that will of course bring about a lot of major changes, it needs a different approach, and it's important to ensure that we do not lag behind. The issue is moving forward very, very quickly, driven by new knowledge and new realities, and if we want to steer this issue and the pace of the debate, we must not lag behind. So that, in my view, is the key challenge, and that is why, my friends, I count myself as what I would call a Euro-optimist. We have an opportunity, until 2009, to implement the core of the Constitution and the key institutional reforms, and to put it bluntly, I am not bothered about the word 'constitution'. I am always being asked, isn't the word 'constitution' too much? No, without the Constitution we would never have moved beyond the intergovernmental conference, after Nice, after Amsterdam and to some extent, as regards the institutions to make the EU fit for enlargement, after Maastricht; there was no other option. And to say that the intergovernmental conference cannot do the job but it must now take the decisions – that would have been impossible, so it only worked via this federalist dream of a constitution. As I said before, core Europe is history, in my view. I believe that the compromise achieved in the institutions is an excellent compromise which represents various traditions and interests, and I can only say that I don't care what the child is called; as long as it yells loudly and lustily at its baptism, its name frankly doesn't matter to me. What does matter is institutional reform, first and foremost: double-hatting in foreign and security policy, a European diplomatic service, and a strong European institution responsible for the coordination and merging of foreign and security policy. Secondly, we should stop making ourselves look ridiculous with the rotating presidency; that doesn't mean a thing to you, and that's part of the problem, as you don't even register its existence. I do not want to offend the smaller countries; I can think of many candidates from smaller countries who would be ideal for a permanent presidency, but let me say this: from a US perspective, these EU-US summits are the limit. There is no date in the diary which seems more meaningless to the Americans, and yet we are their most important partner. And it's easy to explain why: because as a rule – all right, Angela Merkel is well-known – but as a rule, it is a President from a small or medium-sized country, and the US President wonders who it is and he's told, 'don't worry, Mr President, in six months or in three months', that's usually the amount of time left, 'there'll be another one, so don't make the effort, there are more important things to do'. Good people, you are laughing now, but no one's taking us seriously here. I have been at meetings where everyone rolled their eyes when they heard, 'here comes the European Union, here's the presidency'. I understand why, in this institutional framework: there's the presidency, then there is the Commission President, then there is the Commissioner responsible for external affairs, and then there is Solana, who everyone believes is the man responsible but in reality, he has no clout at all, he's sent to the back of the queue at these meetings: the Commission controls the money and it also controls the bureaucracy, that's the reality. So the question of whether we are taken seriously or not is absolutely vital in view of the issues I have been discussing, and so I think a permanent presidency is a key point. So, too, is giving the European Parliament more powers and involving the national parliaments more directly in the European legislative process via the subsidiarity principle.

There is a great deal of political potential here, as well as scope to make the process more democratic and those, to my mind, are the key issues. I also believe that we would be well-advised, in an ever-expanding Union, to maintain dual majority voting, as it establishes a balance between the larger and the smaller countries, between the majority of the populations and the majority of states, and if we incorporate some of the elements from Part III – I would like Part II to be included, but that will happen sooner or later anyway, either via the European Court of Justice or when the opposition to it subsides. For me, the key point is that we need the institutional reforms by 2009. Why 2009? Because I anticipate difficulties in drafting a new financial perspective – in other words, achieving a financial compromise – if the EU does not shift course, away from the danger of renationalisation and towards a new dynamic for European integration, a new dynamic for action. We can see that what Barroso and Blair announced – Europe as a project – is not really working, and how can it? I am very much in favour of Europe as a project, but that means having institutions which can actually drive the project forward; otherwise, Europe will continue to be what we are seeing at the moment, namely a verbal project. What are the prospects for the Europe which I believe we should all be throwing our weight behind? Completing enlargement, driving forward the Neighbourhood Policy at last, and this includes foreign and security policy. Until now, the EU has projected its power through enlargement: it tells candidate countries, you adopt the rules, you implement the rules, and then one day you can join the EU. That is sure to change. I think that here, the European Union's foreign and security policy will also have to take a major step forward. And then everything will depend on our shaping this Europe of interests as a Europe with the capacity to act. 2009 is the perspective, and notwithstanding all the domestic political and intra-party constraints, I urge everyone to understand that this is not a party political issue; it passes through the complexities of the party political process, but it is not a party political issue, it is the issue which will determine the fate of our generation, and in particular the young generation. It concerns the issue of security, the issue of social justice and also the issue of a safe environment; indeed, we could almost say it is about the ecological transformation of society, the transformation not only of our industrial societies but global society. So we need Europe, and I firmly believe that the European Greens are not only the spearhead, they are also the pioneering thinkers, the critical critics, but also and most crucially, they are firmly in the driving seat. Thank you.